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ABSTRACT Emerging technologies rapidly change the essential qualities of modern societies in terms of
smart environments. To utilize the surrounding environment data, tiny sensing devices and smart gateways
are highly involved. It has been used to collect and analyze the real-time data remotely in all Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT). Since the IIoT environment gathers and transmits the data over insecure public
networks, a promising solution known as authentication and key agreement (AKA) is preferred to prevent
illegal access. In the medical industry, the Internet of Medical Things (IoM) has become an expert application
system. It is used to gather and analyze the physiological parameters of patients. To practically examine the
medical sensor-nodes, which are imbedded in the patient’s body. It would in turn sense the patient medical
information using smart portable devices. Since the patient information is so sensitive to reveal other than
a medical professional, the security protection and privacy of medical data are becoming a challenging
issue of the IoM. Thus, an anonymity-based user authentication protocol is preferred to resolve the privacy
preservation issues in the IoM. In this paper, a Secure and Anonymous Biometric Based User Authentication
Scheme (SAB-UAS) is proposed to ensure secure communication in healthcare applications. This paper
also proves that an adversary cannot impersonate as a legitimate user to illegally access or revoke the smart
handheld card. A formal analysis based on the random-oracle model and resource analysis is provided to
show security and resource efficiencies in medical application systems. In addition, the proposed scheme
takes a part of the performance analysis to show that it has high-security features to build smart healthcare
application systems in the IoM. To this end, experimental analysis has been conducted for the analysis
of network parameters using NS3 simulator. The collected results have shown superiority in terms of the
packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, throughput rates, and routing overhead for the proposed SAB-UAS
in comparison to other existing protocols.
INDEX TERMS Authentication and key agreement, internet of medical things, security protection and privacy user authentication, random-oracle model and resource analysis, e-healthcare application, biometrics.
I. INTRODUCTION

Internet of Things (IoT) composes of various physical sensors
or devices/virtual objects that are interconnected to share
information over the public networks. The physical objects
or devices can be a sensor, smart device, camera, drone or
vehicle, and the virtual objects can be a book, electronic ticket
or wallet. In IoT, the connective things or objects should be
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Xiaochun Cheng.
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made to be smart to-do an ingenious decision without human
interference [1]. As a result, the IoT objective is to integrate a
computer-based physical system to improve the accuracy of
social-environmental systems. Gartner Inc. [2] predicts that
there will be around 8.4 billion IoT devices to connect across
the world. IoT devices can generally be a semi-structured or
unstructured in nature [3], which may be an essential property
of 5V big-data namely volume, velocity, variety, veracity and
value. The generated data volume is stored in the cloud, i.e.
an on-demand and effective storage medium [4]. In today’s
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world, technological development adopts the quality IoT features to attain a high degree of production and complete the
task via fewer attempts. And thus, our world is converging
more towards the IIoT. IoT convergence can be applied to various industries, namely transportation, energy/utilities, logistics, manufacturing, mining, metals, oil, gas, and aviation [5].
In accordance with market analysis and academic experts,
it can be defined as the next innovation wave to optimize
the environmental resources. In the use of a sensor or virtual objects, IIoT advances intelligent decision-making and
data analytics to transform the industrial assets. Therefore,
the industries connect the intelligent device or machine to
predict that the IoT markets will extend to $123.89 billion by
2021 [6]. Lately, Advancement of wireless communication
technologies has deeply been functioning for the evolution of
various sensors-based application systems such as environmental test, automobile industries, electronic health care, military, Internet of connected vehicles [7], drone deployment,
etc. [8].
An electronic healthcare system has a wireless medical
sensor network, which has lightweight resources with limited
memory, bandwidth, and processing power [9]. The medical
sensors such as ECG, blood pressure, pulse oximeter, temperature, etc. are generally deployed in a patient’s body to form
a heterogeneous wireless body area network. They sense and
collect the physiological information about patients to transmit over a wireless communication channel which is usually
provided to medical professional smart devices, i.e. iPhone,
Laptop, PDA, implantable medical-devices, etc. [9], [10].
Therefore, it is claimed that the medical professional may
read or consider the assessment for a broader examination as
and when it is demanded to process.
A typical system model of IoM for hospital environment is shown in Fig. 1 as demonstrated in [11] to analyze

the security and performance issues. This system includes
patient, medical professional / practitioner, medical sensors, system database, gateway and server that are used to
offer incredible application benefits namely large-scale medical monitoring, causality emergency medical tracking and
responses. Since data transmission is insecure over public
networks, the protection of the medical sensor is so significant to prevent data tampering. In healthcare application
system, the security and privacy of patient’s data are one of
the biggest concern to adopt wireless communication technologies, namely wireless gateway access, mobile computing
device and medical sensor [12]. Medical sensor nodes are
deployed in the Patient’s body to read the physiological information. A medical professional/expert can access the sensing
data through the authenticated access of a wireless gateway.
Upon mutual authentication, the communication entities such
as medical sensor and experts share a secret session key to
establish secure communication. As a result, it is addressing
the issue of user authentication problem that becomes a significant research area in the field of wireless sensor networks
(WSNs) [11]–[14]. Table 1 define the important abbreviations
used in this paper.
TABLE 1. Important abbreviation used.

A. MOTIVATIONS

FIGURE 1. A system model of internet of medical things.
VOLUME 7, 2019

An extensive effort has been committed to the development
of secure user authentication schemes; however, there is no
significant outcome to achieve better security and privacy.
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As referred to [15], some security goals are afar to attain
by the use of existing cryptosystems. It is evident that an
improved or extended version of the authentication scheme
is recommended to improve the security efficiencies of any
application systems. In literature, very few papers have considered the systematic design and evaluation for security
and performance analysis. On the other hand, most of the
authentication schemes have found to be unsuitable for the
achievement of security goals and its significant features. As a
result, there is no distinctive quality of authentication scheme
to provide a secure and efficient user authentication scheme.
Several improved versions of authentication schemes have
been introduced for various application systems, however,
most of the schemes have found to be unsuitable to claim
the security goals. The crucial points lie in how to accomplish the goals such as providing two-factor security even
if the smartcard is lost or tampered and securing password
update. Huang et al. [14] have addressed more challenging
issues. Lately, Madhusudhan and Mittal [15] have found a
problem of intractability for the design techniques of twofactor cryptosystems. In the literature, two-factor user authentication guarantees that the user can choose his/her password
invariably to draw password space PS uniformly. Since this
assumption is unrealistic, it may cause an effect of misconception. As an instance, the above assumption claims that
the smartcard parameters have been extracted by an adversary Adv .
A probability of Adv success is precisely set as (1 PS )
in an attempt of one online-guessing attack. When a secure
user authentication protocol is applied, a two-factor strategy
PS ensures that an active online-guessing is the best way to
diffuse various attack vectors such as replay, parallel-session,
offline password-guessing, etc. Specifically, Adv the optimal
benefit is meant to infiltrate the threat attacking on PS , which
is not larger than QSend = PS + , where QSend denotes
the number of online impersonation attacks attempted by
Adv and  denotes a negligible-value. On the other hand,
user-chosen passwords are frequently far and wide from uniform distributed. In order to provide a defensive mechanism,
the proposed SAB-UAS scheme introduces a fuzzy verifier,
which can timely infer user’s smartcard depravity. As a result,
it can prevent an online-guessing attack to provide seemliness
intractability addressed in [17].
B. MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS

In this work, a substantial thought is made to investigate
the underlying adversarial model that tries to eliminate the
deficiencies such as redundancies, insufficiencies, ambiguities, etc. using the evaluation criteria set. As for systematic
methodology, a broad set of 12 independent criteria is characterized to analyze the practical capabilities of adversary
model. Though it is completely not available to examine,
it is expected to provide a solid analysis of requirement
definition. Thus, this paper presents a secure-anonymous
biometric-based user authentication scheme (SAB-UAS) not
only to perform smart revocation/reissue, but also to achieve
135634

better security efficiencies using a formal security model.
In SAB-UAS, a long-standing usability-security conflict is
provided to address the traditional optimal-bound security
QSend = PS + . The major contributions are summarized
as follows:
1. Initially, a systematic framework consisting of practical adversarial models and selection criteria is suggested to evaluate secure-anonymous biometric-based
user authentication scheme.
2. Secondly, a defensive strategy of the fuzzy verifier is
introduced to provide timely access, which is helpful to
detect smartcard deprivation in order to prevent potential attacks and seemliness intractability.
3. Thirdly, the proposed SAB-UAS scheme proves that it
can satisfy the selection criterion to show the strength
of security efficiencies.
4. Lastly, the formal and the informal security analysis
demonstrate that the proposed scheme can achieve better security and performance efficiencies to prove its
significance for smart healthcare systems in comparison with other existing schemes [61]–[63].
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION

This paper organizes the sections as follows: Section II briefly
explains the authentication schemes related to IoT and IIoT
environment. Section III discusses the elliptic-curve cryptosystems, fuzzy extractor, threat assumption, and security
properties to signify the use of proposed SAB-UAS scheme.
Section IV presents a secure-anonymous biometric-based
user authentication scheme (SAB-UAS) using a smartcard
for smart electronic healthcare application systems. Section V
demonstrates a formal proof using the random-oracle model,
informal and performance analysis to prove the security efficiency of proposed SAB-UAS scheme. Section VI
demonstrates the practical scenario of proposed SAB-UAS
with other authentication protocols using NS3 simulation.
Section VII concludes this research work.
II. RELATED WORKS

For data confidentiality and secure communication, various
authentication schemes [11]–[14] have been introduced.
However, a security issue in relation to password-based
authentication is preserving a password table to verify
whether the user is legitimate or not. Moreover, it requires
an additional memory space to store the password database.
For the easiness of storage overhead, several researchers
have suggested an alternative solution of fingerprint or iris.
As uniqueness, it is providing a storage benefit to operate a smartcard calculation at more than one security level.
Watro [17] et al. introduced a secure authentication protocol
based on RSA and DH for WSNs. Wong et al. [18] presented
a hash-based dynamic authentication scheme to resist various
potential attacks, namely man-in-the-middle, replay, forgery,
and key impersonation. However, Das [19] demonstrated that
their schemes are susceptible to the privileged-insider attack
VOLUME 7, 2019
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and in addition, they proposed an improved version to achieve
better security efficiencies.
Yoon and Kim [20] proposed a biometric-based user
authentication scheme to prevent security vulnerabilities such
as poor repairability, denial of service (DoS) and sensor
impersonation attack. Choi et al. [21] shown that Yoon and
Kim failed to provide the security issues, namely user verification problem, user anonymity, biometric recognition,
session key exposure, DoS attack, key revocation, and perfect forward secrecy. For the betterment of security efficiencies, they have extended biometric-based user authentication
scheme and also found that their schemes are more secure
than the other authentication and key agreement schemes.
Unfortunately, Park et al. [22] shown that Choi et al. scheme
is still insecure to key impersonation attack. Since WSNs are
dealing with various environmental systems, any adversaries
can physically infer or capture the sensor information from
the sensor memory.
Using extract information of capture sensor node, an adversary may try to damage the entire medical sensor networks.
As a consequence, it is measured as potential vulnerabilities
for WSNs and Medical Sensor Networks as well. At first,
Lamport [23] introduced the password-based authentication protocol. In the past, several authentication protocols
have been proposed [24]–[39]. Chang and Le [24] applied
elliptic-curve cryptosystem to design a lightweight authentication protocol. They developed an ECC-based authentication to achieve the property of forward secrecy. Yeh et al. [25]
constructed a two-factor authentication scheme based ECC
for WSNs. However, their scheme could not achieve the primary goal of security requirement i.e. proper mutual authentication. Additionally, Shi and Gong [26] found that the Yeh
et al scheme is not secure. Later, Choi et al. [27] demonstrated
that Shi et al. scheme is susceptible to secure key sharing,
stolen smartcard, and sensor-energy exhaustion attack. The
attack known as the sensory - energy plays a crucial role
to apply energy consumption issue to limit the lifetime of a
sensor node. To address the issue of sensor-energy exhaustion, Choi et al. enhanced the Shi et al. scheme. However,
their scheme could not preserve user anonymity and untraceability of communication entities. Choi et al. [27] presented
an RFID-based authentication protocol for IoT. Their protocol supports an explicit mutual authentication to protect
the privacy of real-time entities, i.e. reader, tag and database
server. In addition, Li et al. [28] extended their authentication protocol to overcome the security drawbacks of previous mechanism, i.e. IoT based medical-care. This improved
version provides better client anonymity to prevent replay
and data disclosure attack. Later, Li et al. [30] developed a
three-party user authentication protocol, which applies the
Chebyshev and Chaotic-Map to prove the property of client
anonymity. Hameed et al. [31] presented a security protocol
based on integrity mechanism to handle the data integrity in
IoT-based WSNs through the knowledge of gateway access
i.e. base station. Al-Turjman et al. [32] constructed a cloudintegrated architecture to support mobile-edge, IoT and cloud
VOLUME 7, 2019

computing services such as scalability, reliability and feature
adaptability.
Al-Turjman et al. [34] designed seamless key agreement
framework in IoT based cloud-centric network.
Deebak et al. [35] presented a hash-based RFID authentication for context-aware IoT. Furthermore, Roy et al. [37]
developed an ECC-based authentication protocol for IIoT
environment, which applies the biometric-key features to
authenticate the service access. Challa et al. [1] presented
an ECC-based user authentication mechanism for future IoT
applications. However, their scheme consumes more computation and communication overhead in comparison with
non-ECC based authentication mechanism. Wazid et al. [36]
developed a secure lightweight authentication for IoT networks. Their scheme uses biometric, smart card and password
as a three-factor to comply with key agreement properties.
Later, Roy et al. [37] proposed a new user authentication protocol for crowdsourcing IoT. Their scheme claims
the user anonymity in the use of biometric - templates.
Wazid et al. [38] built a new authentication mechanism for
medical counterfeit systems that uses this scheme to verify the authenticity of pharmaceutical i.e. dosage forms.
Al-Turjman and Alturjman [39] proposed a seamless mutual
authentication protocol for IIoT to claim the feature of
context-sensitive awareness. From the literature, the security features and its related drawbacks were studied well.
Accordingly, a secure-anonymous biometric-based user
authentication scheme (SAB-UAS) is presented to suit the
IIoT environment. Table 2 summarizes the technique used,
drawback, formal analysis and simulation used of existing
authentication schemes.
III. SECURITY MODEL & ASSUMPTIONS

This section discusses the elliptic-curve cryptosystem, fuzzy
extractors, threat assumption, and security properties.
A. ELLIPTIC-CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM

At first, Koblitz [40] and Miller [41] have proposed this
cryptosystem. It is widely used in several user authentication schemes [4]–[12] to provide better security efficiency.
An elliptic-curve EC is represented over a field K 6 = 2 or 3
of the characteristics to set the solution (x, y) ∈ K 2 to the
solved equation as follows:
Y 2 = x 3 + ax + b,

∀a, b ∈ K

(1)

where 4a3 + 27b2 6 = 0
Assume that the elliptic-curve cryptosystem is based on
GF (q) that can translate the systems using elliptic-curve
group EC g . It is defined over GF (q) to consider k times of
P additional points i.e. for the scalar point multiplications
KP = (P + P + . . . + P, K times). For given EC , two points
such as P, Q ∈ EC are defined over GF (q) that is used to
find an integer value x such that Q = x.P, if any value of
x exists. Importantly, this strategy is proven to be intractable
than discrete logarithm. The definitions of EC can be referred
135635
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TABLE 2. Summary of technique used, drawbacks, formal analysis model and simulation used of existing authentication schemes.

in [14]. The most significant computational problems based
on EC are given in below:
Definition 1: In elliptic-curve discrete logarithm (ECDF)
problem, two given elements Q, R ∈ GP are used to find an
integer value k ∈ [1, N − 1] such that R = k.Q.
Definition 2: In the elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
(ECDH) problem, three given elements (P, aP, bP) for
any a, b ∈ [1, N − 1] are used to find the computation of abP, which is extremely hard for the elliptic
group GP .
Definition 3: In the elliptic-curve factorization (ECF) problem, two given elements P, Q ∈ GP , where Q = sP + tP and
135636

(s, t) ∈ [1, N − 1] are used to find the computation of sP and
tP that is impossible to calculate in practice.
Definition 4: In decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem, four given elements (P, aP, bP, cP) for any (a, b, c) ∈
[1, N − 1] are used to decide whether cP = abP i.e. ab mod P
or not.
Definition 5: In a weak Diffie-Hellman (WDH) problem,
three given elements (P, Q, kP) are used to compute kQ,
Q ∈ GP for any k ∈ [1, N − 1] that is practically hard to
determine.
Definition 6: In a collision-free hash (CFH) problem, a
given hash-value H (.) is very hard to invert when there is
VOLUME 7, 2019
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computationally infeasible to determine the input x such that
H (a) = h.
A collision resistant hashing i.e. strong collision-free H
is one, which is computationally infeasible to determine any
two message transmission a and b such that H (a) = H (b).
B. FUZZY EXTRACTOR

This subsection discusses the fundamental concepts of a
biometric-based fuzzy extractor, which translates the biometric data into random values. As referred to [42], two
formal procedure such as {GEN , REP } are considered for the
fuzzy extractor. The procedural mechanism of {GEN , REP } is
demonstrated as follows:
1. GEN (BIO ) →
 hR, Pi and
2. REP B∗IO , P = R, if B∗IO is closely associated with BIO
GEN is a probabilistic function, which has a biometric
input-output BIO to extract the string R ∈ {0, 1}l and its auxiliary string P ∈ {0, 1}∗ . REP is a deterministic reproduction,
which is used to recover string R from auxiliary string P i.e.
any vector B∗IO closed to BIO . The details of fuzzy extraction
are also referred to [43].
C. THREAT ASSUMPTION

Dolev-Yao [42] and other threat models [44] is basically
introduced to consider a threat of side-channel attack that
constructs the threat assumptions. They are as follows:
A. An adversary Adv can either be a sensor node, medical
professional/expert or wireless gateway. In addition,
any registered / legitimate user can also be possible to
act as an adversary.
B. An adversary Adv can overhear any communication
over public insecure networks. Therefore, any data
transmission can be leaked or captured between the
communication entities such as sensor node, medical
professional/expert or wireless gateway.
C. Importantly, an adversary Adv may alter or delete or
reroute the captured data.
D. An adversary Adv may extract the information from
smartcard SM c to analyze the card power storage
capacity.
In the conventional password authentication and key
agreement (PAKA) protocol, Adv is modeled to provide complete control over the communication channel between the
real-time communication entities [45]. To characterize the
qualities of forward-secrecy, Adv may allow corrupting validity of communication parties to infer the long-term secret key.
In addition, Adv may obtain previous session keys in order
to examine improper erasure. Recent analysis has proven
that the extraction of security parameters could be deduced
to experience power-analysis attack], software-loophole [46]
and reverse engineering. The leakage of sensitive information
may lead to security vulnerabilities such as offline passwordguessing [34] and impersonation attack [35]. It is also evident
that the stored session key in smartcard may be intercepted to
experience malicious card-reader attack [14]. However, the
VOLUME 7, 2019

attacker can intercept the storage key via card-reader to read
the user’s secret information through stolen or lost smartcard.
This may enable the attackers to intercept any secure
authentication scheme, though it adheres with extreme adversary principles [47]. It uses robust security to protect against
adversarial activities that would trivially break any types
of user authentication schemes. The above treatment is as
follows: 1. the malicious user may break terminal access
to underway an attack of side-channel; and 2. an attacker
may leak the sensitive information of legal user within a
short time interval. This analysis tries to invalidate overlyconservative proposition that may simply presume a smartcard to be an external memory card using an embedded microcontroller to perform a cost-effective operation, supported
by security schemes. As memory-card based authentication
scheme is completely insecure over public networks, all the
memory-card based authentication schemes [16] were truly
insecure over un-trusted terminals. Therefore, the conditional
assumption of non-tamper resistive is more secured than
extreme assumption referred to [17].
In SAB-UAS scheme, the capabilities of Adv are summarized in Section II-B. The previous works provide a new
insight to fairly evaluate the integrity of the proposed scheme.
Wang et al. [48] introduced three types of security model such
as Type-I, Type-II and Type-III. Of which Type-III is more
influential to make use in practice. The brief descriptions are
as follows:
Type – I: Adv has a full-control of a communication channel, which is inconsistent.
Type – II: Smartcard is non-tampered resistant and user’s
password may be secretly listened over a communication
channel using malicious card-reader by Adv . The former is
more consistent than the latter assumption.
Type – III: Smartcard has no security protection i.e.
Adv may distribute numerous queries to learn useful
information of users using the malicious card-reader
attack.
In regard to threat assumption C, it is argued that this
assumption might not be of much practical importance to
validate whether it is practically applicable or not to ensure
its security relevance. On the other hand, the input password
is verified before the execution of smartcard to learn useful
information of corresponding remote-server that may lock
the legal user account. If the above verification exists, then
Adv can always detect a user’s password using a malicious
card –reader. The key conflict is that Adv of Type-III is not
exclusively defined in threat assumption C and D. As referred
in [48], this may minimally assume the counter protection
to infer whether the lock time-period exceeds the threshold
limit or not. According to the above verification, the proposed
SAB-UAS model is very close to Type-III model in [49].
As a result, Type-III may not provide the security features
such as forward-secrecy and known-key attack. According to
Yang et al. [16], the proposed SAB-UAS has explicitly considered the malicious card-reader and Adv is further specified
with threat assumptions C and D.
135637
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In SAB-UAS Adv model, it is assumed to be able to
offline-guessing that is enumerated of {UID , Adi } pair in the
product of Cartesian {DID × DAD } with polynomial time. It is
enabled to deal with potential security features [34]–[37]
such as resilient to offline-password guessing, undetectable
online-password guessing, etc. Note that the threat assumption of B has yet been explicitly made in [34], which do
not consider the security feature of user anonymity, whereas
the proposed SAB-UAS model becomes stronger in practical
aspect to incorporate previous and new assumption to provide
a robust and secure authentication protocol.
D. SECURITY PROPERTIES

As referred in Yang et al. [16], the constructive analysis shows that the smartcard-based user authentication
schemes have a common set of security properties to
adopt the efficiencies of user authentication protocols.
Madhusudhan and Mittal [15] demonstrated that an earlier
set of security properties has ambiguities and redundancies,
and thus they presented nine different sets of security goals
along with ten desirable features. Since the security goals
are based on the assumption of non-tamper resistance, their
authentication scheme is set to be superior. However, it is
still having the challenging issues to notice inherent security
conflicts among set criteria. The security properties are as
follows:
C.1 No Password Verifier-Table: The server system does
not maintain a verifier database to store user-password
or derive a value of user passwords.
C.2 Password Friendliness: The user passwords are memorable and can be opted generously to change user
passwords.
C.3 No-Password Exposure: The user passwords cannot
be derived by the server administrator.
C.4 No Smartcard Loss Attack: The scheme is completely free from smartcard loss attack i.e. unauthorized user acquiring a legal user card should not be able
to change the password of smartcard easily or recover
the victim’s password by means of online, offline,
hybrid password guessing or key impersonate attack
to login in to the server systems, even if the smartcard
is obtained or revealed to incur the secret-data.
C.5 Resilient To Known-Key Attack: The scheme can
be resilient to various potential attacks comprising
of offline password-guessing, replay, parallelguessing, de-synchronization, stolen-verifier, keyimpersonation, unknown key-share, and key-control
and known-key.
C.6 Sound Repairability: The smartcard tries to provide
smartcard revocation with reasonable repairability i.e.
a legitimate user may revoke his/her smartcard without
changing their identities.
C.7 Provision of User Key-Agreement: The client and
server can establish a common secret session-key for
secure data communication between the real-time entities during the system authentication phase.
135638

C.8 No Clock Synchronization: The scheme is not easily
prone time delay and synchronization i.e. the server
does not need to synchronize its clock time with the
input devices utilized by smartcard and vice versa.
C.9 Timely Based Typo-Detection: The user can timely
notify if he/she enters a wrong password by fault when
login being accessed.
C.10 Proper Mutual Authentication: The user and server
can mutually verify the authentication of each other.
C.11 User Anonymity: The authentication scheme can
defend or protect the user activities to save from
intractability.
C.12 Forward - Secrecy: The scheme can try to achieve the
property of perfect forward secrecy.
It is evidently pointing out that criterion set – C4 provides
the attacking scenario where Adv has acquired the smartcard
access while C5 has no gain of access to victim’s smartcard.
The criterion set - C4 assumes a traditional smartcard reissue
to reveal user’s smartcard access using the random-oracle
model. The criterion set – C5 is completely based on basic
attacks [15], [16] that a password related authentication
scheme is well guarded on new attack vectors e.g. stolen
verifier addressed in two-factor authentication systems. It is
demonstrated that the criterion is set to eliminate redundancies and ambiguities of the traditional authentication system
in order to facilitate concreteness based cryptanalysis. Further, the efficiency of the proposed authentication scheme
may be contingent upon the implementation of real-time
environmental systems. An extensive comparison proves that
the proposed adversarial model is so hard and the criterion
sets are more concrete and comprehensive in comparison with
existing schemes.
IV. PROPOSED SAB-UAS SCHEME

This section presents a secure-anonymous biometric-based
user authentication scheme (SAB-UAS) using smartcard.
In SAB-UAS, three communication entities namely medical
expert ME , wireless gateway access WGAc and medical sensor
MS j . WGAc generates two master keys such as mx and my
and transmits a long-term secret key H SIDj k my to MS
before the SAB-UAs scheme initiates its execution process.
Then, WGAc tries to compute mx .P, which is considered as
a gateway’s public key. The proposed SAB-UAS scheme is
composed of three phases namely user registration, system
login, authentication and revocation/reissue. The important
notation of SAB-UAS is shown in Table 3.
A. USER REGISTRATION PHASE

This phase chooses a user identity UID that imprints a biometric template BTi on Usr to perform the following execution.
Step1: MS initiates BTi to extract hRi , Pi i from
GEN (BTi ) → hRi , Pi i and then stores the values Pi in the
memory storage. Upon Pi storage, MS sends hUID , Adi =
H(Ri )i to WGAc over a secure communication channel.
Step2: After receiving the registration request hUID , Adi i
from MS , WGAc computes the user authentication parameters
VOLUME 7, 2019
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MS1 = r2 ⊕ H (CI ) ;

TABLE 3. Important notations of SAB-UAS scheme.

(9)

MS2 = H (ADi k H (CI ) k Yi k r2 k TSi )
MS3 = Ni ⊕ (r1 × xP)

(10)
(11)

where TSi is the current timestamp. Usr sends the login
request {ADi ,Yi , MS1 , MS2 , MS3 , TSi } to WGAc .
Step4: After receiving a login requestfrom Usr , WGAc tries
to retrieve TS0 and verifies TS0 − TSi ≤ 1TS. If the verification is valid, then WGAc computes C∗I , r∗2 , ID∗i and MS∗2
to compare C∗I with H ID∗i k mx k my . The comparison of
MS∗2 with MS2 is as follows:

C∗I = MS3 ⊕ (mx × Yi ) ⊕ mx ⊕ my ; r∗2 = MS1 ⊕ H r∗2 ;
(12)
ID∗i = ADi ⊕ H r∗2

that are as follows:

CI = H UID k mx k my ;

(2)

MSI = H (CI ) ⊕ Adi ;
NI = mx ⊕ CI ⊕ my ;

(3)

VRI = H (UID k Adi )

(5)

(4)

Step3: WGAc stacks the user authentication parameters
namely MSI , NI , VRI and H (.) into smartcard SMI . WGAc
then issues SMI to MS over a secure communication channel.
Step4: Finally, MS stores Pi into smartcard.
B. SYSTEM LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE

This phase performs a login phase for Usr ; and thus the entities such as WGAc , Usr and MSj use a common session key to
authenticate each other. The authentication step between Usr
and MSj are as follows:
Step1: Usr inserts his/her SM into the card-reader CR that
reads the user identity UID to imprint his/her biometric information B∗IO at MS .
Step2:
MS then initiates B∗IO to extract Ri from

REP B∗IOi , Pi → hRi i. Then, SMI computes Ad∗i and VR∗I
using a fuzzy extractor. Lastly, it compares VR∗I with VRI
that is as follows:


R∗i = REP B∗IOi , Pi ; Ad∗i = H R∗i ; VR∗I =

H UID k Ad∗i ; then Verifies, whether VRI == VR∗I or not
Step3: SMI generates two random numbers r1 and r2 to
compute:
Yi = r1 ×P;
H (CI ) = MSI ⊕ Ad∗i ;
ADi = UID ⊕ H (r2 ) ;
VOLUME 7, 2019

(6)
(7)
(8)



(13)

After the successful
generation of C∗I , the expression

∗
H IDi k mx k my is examined to check whether it is valid
or not. Then, the generated MS∗2 is validated with MS2 to
analyze its equality measure. If the above analysis is valid,
then WGAc verifies the legitimacy of Usr .
Step5: WGAc tries to compute the parameters such as
Kg , Cg and Wg to validate whether the communication is
authenticated or not between Usr and MSj . The expressions
are as follows:


Kg = H H SDj k my k TSg
(14)
Cg = ECkg (ADi k r2 k Yi ) ;


Wg = H H SDj k my k ADi k Cg k TSg

(15)
(16)

where TSg is the current data timestamp.
 WGAc then tries to
send the user authentication message ADi , Cg , TSg , Wg to
MSj .
Step6: After the successful authentication message from
00
WGAc , MSj tries to
 retrieve TS in order to verify
00
whether TS − TSg ≤ 1TS. If the verification holds,
then MSj examines
the Wg validation
to compare with


H H SDj k my k ADi k Cg k TSg to verify the legitimacy
of WGAc . Then, MSj checks whether ADi equates with AD∗i
or not to execute the following equation:


K∗g = H H SDj k mx k TSg
(17)
D∗Kg = AD∗i k r∗2 k Y∗i

(18)

K∗g

After a successful generation of
and DKg , ADi compares with AD∗i to validate the user authentication message.
Step7: MSj generates a random number rn that computes
KSU , Zi , RM and Vfs to create a user session key USK . The
computation is as follows:
KSU = rn ×Y∗i ;

Zi = rn × P

USK = H (ADi k KSU k TS)
RM = Query Response of Usr

Vfs = H ADi k r∗2 k Zi k USK k RM k TS

(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)

where TS is the current data timestamp. MSj sends the communication parameters {RM , Zi , Vfs , TS} to Usr .
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Step8: After receiving the message {RM , Zi , Vfs , TS} from
MSj , Usr computes USK to validate whether Vf∗s equates Vfs
or not. The computation is as follows:
KSU = r1 ×Zi ;
Vf∗s

USK = H (ADi k KSU k TS)

= H (ADi k r2 k Zi k USK k RM k TS)

TABLE 4. Algorithm ExpSAB−UAS
Hash,Ad .

(23)
(24)

Lastly, the legitimate user Usr computes KSU and USK to
establish a secure communication USK .
C. REVOCATION / REISSUE PHASE

To compensate the smart card loss or long-term key disclosure, the loss or tampered smartcard should be periodically
revoked or reissued at a cyclic basis.
Step1: Assume that Usr wishes to revoke his/her SM.
To execute this scenario, he/she should insert their SMI to
generate a new identity U∗ID from the previous identity UID
to prevent the adversaries act. Then, the successful update of
U∗ID imprints the user biometric B∗IOi on MSj .


Step2: MSj initiates B∗IOi to extract Ri from REP B∗IOi , Pi
→hRi i. Subsequently, SMI computes Ad∗i and VR∗I using a
fuzzy extractor.



Ri = REP B∗IOi , Pi ; and Adi = H R∗i
Step3: Usr computes Zi = UIDi ⊕ MSi ton send the revocation/reissuing request message parameters UIDi , U∗IDi , Adi ,
Zi } via WGAc over a secure communication channel.
Step4: WGAc initially validates whether UID is similar to
U∗IDi or not. If the similarity is not held, then WGAc tries to
compute MS∗i and Z∗i to validate the legitimacy of user Usr .
The computation is as follows:

C∗I = H U∗ID k mx k my ; and Z∗i = UID ⊕ H (CI ) ⊕ Adi .
The verification of Z∗i with Zi is employed to prove user
legitimacy.
Step5: if the user legitimacy holds, WGAc revokes UIDi and
update the same in the revocation lookup table. Consequently,
WGAc determines new computation parameters {Vfi , Ni , CI }.
The expressions are as follows:

CI = H UID k mx k my ; MSi = H (CI ) ⊕ Adi

Ni = mx ⊕ CI ⊕ my ; Vfi = H U∗ID k Adi
Step6: WGAc stacks H (.) and new authentic parameters
{MSi , Ni , Vfi , H (.)} in the storage of smartcard SMI . Then,
WGAc newly issue SMI to Usr through a secure communication channel.
Step7: Finally, Usr stores the details of Pi in to the smartcard SM.
V. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED
SAB-UAS

This section demonstrates a formal proof using the
random-oracle model that proves the security efficiency of
proposed SAB-UAS scheme. A collision-free one-way hash
function is considered to specify the significance of random
value r2 and master secret session-keys mx and my of WGAc .
135640

Assume that a function of collision-free one-way hashing
is defined as: f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n . It has an input binary
string a ∈ {0, 1}∗ , which has a random binary to produce a
length of H (a) ∈ {0, 1}n . It can satisfy the requirements as
follows:
Given that b ∈ B, but it couldn’t find the computational of
a ∈ A such that b = H (a)
Given that a ∈ A, but it couldn’t
find the computational of

a0 6 = a ∈ A such that H a0 = H (a)
It is not fortunate thatthe computation couldn’t determine
abouta string pair a0 , a ∈ A0 × A with a0 6 = a ∈ A such that
H a0 = H (a).
Theorem 1: It is assumed that the collision-free one-way
hash function H (.) closely represents a formal random based
oracle model. The proposed SAB-UAS scheme distinctively
proves that the secure session key US K protects the sensitive information including user identity UID , random binarystring r2 and master secret-key mx and my of WGAc to prevent
any adversaries.
Proof: A formal random-oracle model can remove the
input key mx for the given hash function b = H (a) without key failure. Adv runs the executable programs as shown
in Table 4. A function ExpSAB−UAS
Hash,Ad represents a proposed
SAB-UAS scheme that defines a success probability.
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A success probability hof ExpSAB−UAS
is
Hash,Ad
i defined as
SAB−UAS
SAB−UAS
SuccessHash,Ad
= Pr ExpHash,Ad = 1 − 1 , where

TABLE 5. Important BAN logic notation.

Pr (.) represents a probability of ExpSAB−UAS
Hash,Ad . The
adversarial function  of this algorithm is written as
AdvSAB−UAS
et , Query , where et is the time of execution and
Hash,Ad
Query is the executable number of queries. Assume that Adv
has the capabilities to work out the hash functioning problem
provided in Definition6, where he/she can immediately try
to retrieve the parameters such as user identity UID , random
binary-string r2 and master secret-key mx and my of WGAc .
In this case, Adv may wish to detect the complete communication between Usr and WGAc . However, the input inversion
from the given hashing is computationally not possible i.e.
AdvSAB−UAS
Hash,Ad (et ) ≤ , ∀ > 0.

Therefore, AdvSAB−UAS
et , Query
≤  depends on
Hash,Ad
AdvSAB−UAS
As
A
has
less
possibility
to detect the
(e
).
t
dv
Hash,Ad
complete connection setup between Usr and WGAc , the proposed SAB-UAS scheme distinctively proves that the secure
session key US K protects the sensitive information from Adv
to retrieve UID , r2 , mx , my . Hence, the proposed SAB-UAS
claims to achieve better security efficiencies.
A. SECURITY PROOF BASED BAN LOGIC

This subsection uses Burrows Abadi Needham (BAN)
logic [50] to demonstrate that the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme is completely valid and practically efficient to prevent
known-key attacks in order to satisfy the security efficiency of
e-healthcare systems. This model has become a well-known
formal cryptographic protocol that is widely used to analyze
the authentication scheme. The important notations and BAN
logical postulates are described in Table 5. According to
analytical BAN logical procedure, the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme shall assure the below goals:


USK
1. Goal1 : Usri | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc


USK
2. Goal2 : Usri | ≡ WGAc | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc


USK
3. Goal3 : WGAc | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc


USK
4. Goal4 : WGAc | ≡ Usri | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc
Initially, the proposed SAB-UAS scheme is transformed to
idealize the message transmissions that are as follows:


1. Msg 1: Usri → DC : UIDi , X 
H UIDj kmy


2. Msg 2: Usri → DC : UIDi , X,SIDj , Y 
H SIDj kmy

3. Msg 3: DC → Usri :hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri
Y

↔ WGAc i



H UIDj kmy

4. Msg 4: DC → WGAc :hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri
X


↔ WGAc i 
H SIDj kmy

5. Msg 5: WGAc → Usri :hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri
USK

↔ WGAc iUSK
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6. Msg 6: Usri → WGAc :hSIDj , UIDj , X, Y, Usri
USK

↔ WGAc iUSK

Secondly, the following assumptions are made to initiate
and analyze the proposed SAB-UAS scheme:
Asgn1 : Usri | ≡ 6 = (X)
Asgn2 : WGAc | ≡ 6 = (Y)


H UIDj kmy

Asgn3 : Usri | ≡ Usri ←−−−−−→ DC


H UIDj kmy

Asgn4 : DC | ≡ Usri ←−−−−−→ DC


H SIDj kmy

Asgn5 : WGAc | ≡ WGAc ←−−−−−→ DC


H SIDj kmy

Asgn6 : DC | ≡ WGAc ←−−−−−→ DC


Y
Asgn7 : Usri | ≡ DC H⇒ Usri ↔ WGAc
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X
Asgn8 : WGAc | ≡ DC H⇒ Usri ↔ WGAc


USK
Asgn9 : WGAc | ≡ Usri H⇒ Usri ←→ WGAc


USK
Asgn10 : Usri | ≡ WGAc H⇒ Usri ←→ WGAc
Thirdly, the idealized form of the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme is analyzed using BAN-logic rules and assumptions.
The proofs of statements are as follows:
According to Msg 1, the expression could be:


WGAc1 : DC G UIDi , X 
H UIDj kmy

According to Asgn4 , a rule of message-meaning is applied
to obtain:

WGAc2 : DC | ≡ Usri | ∼ UIDi , X
According to Msg 2, the expression could be:

WGAc3 : DC G UIDi , X, SIDj , Y 



According to Asgn2 , a rule of BAN-logic is applied to
break the conjunction to produce:
X

WGAc13 : WGAc | ≡ DC | ≡ Usri ↔ WGAc
According to Asgn8 , a rule of jurisdiction is applied to
obtain:
X

WGAc14 : WGAc | ≡ Usri ↔ WGAc
According to USK = y × X = xy × P, the expression
could be:
USK

WGAc16 : WGAc | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc

hGoal3i

USK

WGAc17 : Usri GhUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ←→ WGAc iUSK

According to Asgn6 , a rule of message-meaning is applied
to obtain:

WGAc4 : DC | ≡ WGAc | ∼ UIDi , X, SIDj , Y
According to Msg 3, the expression could be:
Y



H UIDj kmy

According to Asgn4 , a rule of message-meaning is applied
to obtain:
WGAc6 :
X

Usri | ≡DC | ∼ hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ↔ WGAc i



H SIDj kmy

According to Asgn3 , a rule of message-meaning is applied
to obtain:
WGAc7 :
X

Usri | ≡ DC | ≡ hUIDj ,SIDj , X, Y, Usri ↔ WGAc i



H SIDj kmy

According to WGAc7 , a rule of BAN-logic is applied to
break the conjunction to produce:

According to WGAc10 , a rule of message-meaning is
applied to obtain:
USK

WGAc18 : Usri | ≡ WGAc | ∼hUIDj ,SIDj ,X, Y, Usri ←→WGAc i
According to Asgn1 , a rule of freshness concatenation is
applied to obtain:
USK

WGAc19 : Usri |≡WGAc |≡hUIDj , SIDj ,X, Y,Usri ←→ WGAc i
According to WGAc19 , a rule of BAN-logic is applied to
break the conjunction to produce:
USK

WGAc20 : Usri |≡WGAc | ≡Usri ←→ WGAc

hGoal2i

According to Msg 6, the expression could be:
USK

WGAc21 : WGAc G hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ←→ WGAc iUSK
According to WGAc16 , a rule of message-meaning is
applied to obtain:
USK

WGAc22 : WGAc | ≡ Usri | ∼hUIDj ,SIDj ,X,Y, Usri ←→WGAc i
According to Asgn2 , a rule of freshness concatenation is
applied to obtain:

Y

WGAc8 : Usri | ≡ DC | ≡ Usri ↔ WGAc
According to Asgn7 , a rule of jurisdiction is applied to
obtain:

USK

WGAc23 : WGAc | ≡ Usri | ≡ hUIDj , SIDj ,X,Y, Usri ←→WGAc i
According to WGAc23 , a rule of BAN-logic is applied to
break the conjunction to produce:

Y

WGAc9 : Usri | ≡ Usri ↔ WGAc
According to USK = x × Y = xy × P, the expression
could be:
Y

WGAc10 : Usri | ≡ Usri ↔ WGAc

hGoal1i

According to Msg 4, the expression could be:
X

WGAc11 : WGAc GhUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ↔ WGAc i



H SIDj kmy
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X

WGAc12 : WGAc | ≡ DC | ∼hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ↔ WGAc i

According to Msg 5, the expression could be:

H SIDj kmy

WGAc5 : Usri G hUIDj , SIDj , X, Y, Usri ↔ WGAc i

According to Asgn5 , a rule of message-meaning is applied
to obtain:

USK

WGAc24 : WGAc | ≡ Usri | ≡ Usri ←→ WGAc

hGoal4i

According to hGoal1i, hGoal2i, hGoal3i and hGoal4i, both
Usri and WGAc is believed that the secure session key
USK = xyP is mutually shared between Usri and WGAc to
adhere to a property of known-key security. Table 3 describes
the important notation of BAN logic.
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This subsection shows that the proposed SAB-UAS scheme
has resiliencies to withstand various potential attacks to
achieve better security efficiencies.

symmetric-key encryption. Hence, in the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme, user identity UID the derivation is computationally impracticable to achieve the property of user-anonymity
preservation.

1) RESILIENT TO PRIVILEGED-INSIDER ATTACK

5) PASSWORD FRIENDLINESS

This attack uses WGAc to collect the user credentials from
data-center DC that tries to obtain access to the legitimate
user. To resist privileged-insider attack, the credentials of the
proposed SAB-UAS scheme hUID , Adi i are securely transmitted. It is masked with a one-way hash
 function to generate
a long-term secret key H SIDj k my . Moreover, the master
keys such as mx and my use biometric template BTi on Usr
to extract hRi , Pi i from GEN (BTi ) → hRi , Pi i that stores
values of Pi in storage-memory. Assume that legitimate user
has lost his/her smartcard SMi and Adv tries to extract the
legal information of Usr such as hMSI , NI , VRI , H(.)i using
a power-analysis mechanism. However, Adv cannot infer or
extract secret session-key to perform parallel-guessing attack
as the master keys such as mx and my are not known. Hence,
the proposed SAB-UAS scheme claims the resiliency of
privileged-insider attack.

In proposed SAB-UAS scheme, Usr freely chooses his/her
secret session-key USK to register or modify at DC . Moreover,
the proposed SAB-UAS scheme supports revocation/reissue
of smartcard SM through the knowledge of DC . Hence,
the proposed scheme claims better user efficiency and
friendliness.

B. IN-FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS

2) RESILIENT TO STOLEN SMARTCARD ATTACK

Assume that smartcard SM of Usr maybe stolen or lost.
Adv tries to extract Usr credential information namely

hMSI , NI , VRI , H(.)i, where CI = H UID k mx k my ;
MSI = H (CI ) ⊕ Adi ; NI = mx ⊕ CI ⊕ my ;
VRI = H (UID k Adi ) using a power-analysis mechanism.
It is evident that Usr credential information is completely protected using master secret keys hmx , my i
and biometric template BTi . Since key-replication or
parallel-guessing is computationally hard, key-inference or
credential derivative is impracticable. Hence, the proposed
SAB-UAS scheme claims the resiliency of stolen smartcard
attack.
3) RESILIENT TO STOLEN-VERIFIER ATTACK

Assume that Adv tries to steal Usr credentials that temporally
store information in WGAc to perform malicious activities.
However, in the proposed SAB-UAS scheme, WGAc does not
allow Adv to infer the sensitive information of Usr related
to user identity UID and biometric template BTi . Hence,
the proposed SAB-UAS scheme claims the resiliency of
stolen-verifier attack.
4) USER-ANONYMITY PRESERVATION

In security application systems, user-anonymity plays a vital
role. Therefore, it is highly demanded to strengthen wireless communication technologies and pervasive computing.
To protect user identity UID , the proposed SAB-UAS scheme
securely keeps Usr secret information, biometric template
and master key hmx , my i. In addition, it is evident that the
transmission messages of proposed SAB-UAS scheme preserve biometric template and master key hmx , my i using
VOLUME 7, 2019

6) RESILIENT TO USER-FORGERY ATTACK

Assume that Adv wishes to forge a message MS1 to deduce
the key elements such as hr2 , UID , mx , my i. As Adi is directly
associated with master-key hmx , my i, Adv cannot easily
infer the collective information of message transmission
MSI = H (CI )⊕Adi . Hence, the proposed SAB-UAS scheme
can be resilient to user-forgery attack.
7) RESILIENT TO SENSOR-CAPTURE ATTACK

In the proposed SAB-UAS scheme, Adv tries to seize the
control of some sensor nodes MSj that establishes the communication with Usr . However, Adv cannot easily capture or
forge message transmission MS3 as it is built or constructed
using Ni . Moreover, MSj shares a common session-key USK
with WGAc , which is not at all related to KSU . Therefore, the
proposed SAB-UAS scheme claims that Adv couldn’t exploit
this attack successfully.
8) RESILIENT TO GATEWAY-FORGERY ATTACK

This attack has an ability to forge message transmission
MS1 or MS2 . In order to fabricate the message transmission
MS1 , a critical parameter known as USK is extremely subjective that tries to infer the messages namely MS1 and MS3 .
Unfortunately, the master keys hmx , my i cannot be forged
simultaneously to verify the session key KSU of WGAc .
Hence, the proposed scheme is resilient to gateway-forgery
attack.
9) RESILIENT TO KNOWN-KEY ATTACK

This attack realizes that the disclosure of session-key
will have an effect on the security of the secret key.
In the proposed SAB-UAS scheme, a secret session-key
USK = H (ADi k KSU k TS) is derived from KSU = r1 ×Zi ,
where Zi = rn ×P. This computation proves that Usr sessionkey is generated independently to claim that the revelation of
USK has no authority on the exploitation of other sessions
keys. Hence, the proposed scheme can be resilient to knownkey attack.
10) RESILIENT TO OFFLINE-GUESSING ATTACK

A three-factor authentication scheme ensures that even if
Adv infers the information of any two-communication parties,
he/she may not be able to break up the remote server systems.
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In this scheme, Adv tries to gather the parameters such as
biometric and password, however, he/she could not acquire
a possible computation of Yi to build a legal login request
message. Similarly, Adv tries to gather the parameters such
as password and smartcard, nonetheless, he/she cannot either
perform a proper computation of Yi nor predict the biometric
information. Hence, it could not execute the offline-guessing
attack. Also, Adv tries to gather the parameters such as biometric and smartcard, nonetheless, he/she may have a chance
to explore an offline guessing attack by means of MSI or BTi
to verify the correctness of guessing value.
Assume that Adv exploits BTi to explore the offline
guessing attack and its execution steps as follows: Adv
hypothecates UID and Adi into U∗ID and Ad∗i respec
tively. This hypothecation computes R∗i = REP B∗IOi , Pi ;


Ad∗i = H R∗i ; and VR∗I = H UID k Ad∗i to check whether
VRI ==VR∗I or not. However, Adv cannot infer a proper
UID and Adi to send a login request to WGAc without the
knowledge of Pi . Thus, the proposed scheme claims that it
can be resilient to offline-guessing attack.
11) PROPERTY OF MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND
KEY AGREEMENT

In proposed SAB-UAS scheme, it is observed that Usr and
WGAc should respond to MSj . Specifically, WGAc uses
a long-term secret value SIDj to generate a correct message transmission MSI = H (CI ) ⊕ Adi , where Adi = H (Ri )
and it is validated using
 Usr . In another way, Usr applies
CI = H UID k mx k my and ADi = UID ⊕ H (r2 ) to generate a corrective response-value MS3 that is verified using
WGAc . This verification shows that Usr and WGAc mutually
passes the authenticated message transmission to exchange
the messages of MSj . Hence, the proposed scheme claims to
achieve the property of mutual authentication.
With a generation of session-key, it is observed that Usr
and WGAc plays a vital role to contribute to the generation
of session-key namely hmx , my i. This has a logical consequence that neither any Usr can generate or control his/her
session-key, nor any session-key can be adequate to produce
random-key if any of the Usr be able to construct a sufficient
random input-keys. Hence, the proposed scheme claims the
preservation of key agreement.
12) PROPERTY OF PERFECT FORWARD SECRECY

In proposed SAB-UAS scheme, a property of perfect
forward-secrecy necessitates a long-term secret information
hSIDj i to be highly secured between Usr and WGAc that
ensures all the previous key establishments are well protected. Based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the proposed
scheme claims to achieve better forward secrecy. With the
secret-key information of Usr and WGAc , Adv tries to recover
USK = H (ADi k KSU k TS). However, from the specific
feature of intractability based on the Diffie-Hellman problem,
the proposed scheme claims that it is impracticable for Adv to
compute KSU = rn ×Y∗i .
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C. RESOURCE EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS

This subsection estimates various resource efficiencies such
as storage, computation, and communication of proposed
SAB-UAS scheme. The analysis details are as follows:
1) ANALYZING STORAGE EFFICIENCY

In order to analyze storage overhead, the communication
messages of a user Usr and smartcard SMI are chosen. Particularly, if we apply SHA − 1, byte-length of 20 is set to the
following parameters namely random number r1 and r2 , user
identity UID and hash-resistant function, whereas byte-length
of data timestamp is 2. Therefore, the proposed SAB-UAS
claims that the total storage data length can easily be calculated for CI , MSI , NI and VRI . In respect of storage, the saved
messages require 80 bytes.
2) ANALYZING COMMUNICATION EFFICIENCY

In order to examine communication overhead, Usr login
request message {ADi ,Yi , MS1 , MS2 , MS3 , TSi } is considered, which is later submitted to WGAc in turn to process
the login. According to the above assumption of byte-length,
the message length of Usr is 102 bytes. Similarly, the bytelength of WGAc computation and Usr the response is calculated and its summation is 30 + 20 = 50 bytes during
the system authentication phase. Thus, the system login and
authentication phase of SAB-UAS scheme are totaled into
102 + 50 = 152 bytes.
3) ANALYZING COMPUTATION EFFICIENCY

In order to realize the complexity of computational efficiency, the frequency of hash resistant function is considered.
Importantly, the computation time of the X-OR operation is
practically ignored as it has less time to execute the process.
As referred in [34], the environment of 2.20 GHz CPU and
2 GB RAM consumes 0.0023 ms to execute the hash resistant
function on an average. Therefore, the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme claims that the execution times of hash function in
system login and authentication phases are 7 and 13 times
respectively. The calculation shows that the computation cost
of SAB-UAS is recorded into 0.0161 + 0.0299 = 0.046 ms.
D. COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE EFFICIENCY

As from Table 6, the time cost of various authentication
phases is compared in terms of TCM denotes one-way chaotic
map function, TSED denotes symmetric encryption / decryption and Thash denotes one-way hashing function respectively.
Importantly, Thash is examined using SHA1. A test platform
used in [52] is also applied to examine the computation
parameters such as TCM = 127.042 µs, TSED = 21.4835µs
and Thash = 21.4835µs. It is supposed that all the authentication schemes including timestamps, random-integers, a hashing function, wireless gateway access, and medical-sensor
node are set the key size as 160 bits. However, the chaotic
map results in the key size of 1024 bits long as it is capable
to perform modular prime in order to provide more security.
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TABLE 6. Performance efficiencies of existing authentication schemes.

controller node with a distance of 25 meters and 50 meters
respectively, considered in [55]. A communication standard
known as IEEE-802.15.4 is used as media access control
to simulate the network duration ≈1800 s i.e. 30 minutes.
Because of network nature i.e. Ad hoc, optimized link state
routing (OLSR) is preferred. It is used to provide dynamic
discovery that invokes proactive routing to maintain the distribution table between the communication entities. Table 7
represents the important notation used in simulation.
TABLE 7. Important simulation parameters.

In [53], it is discussed that the basis of communication cost
is more non-trivial. A detailed hypothesis shows that the user
identities, timestamps, and random integers are assigned to
be 32 bits or only 4 bytes.
Generally, the storage character of user identity cannot be
less than six characters. Since DES is widely known to be
insecure [53], a key size 56 bits is even not considered as
a secure key length. The performance analysis demonstrates
that the execution times of the proposed scheme have less
cost in comparison with other existing schemes [54]–[56]
for the communication entities namely Usr , WGAc and MS j .
After all, the proposed SAB-UAS scheme is claimed to be
robust and secure in order to realize in practice. However,
Gope and Hwang [55] are completely impracticable as it is
susceptible to a de-synchronization attack. In the wireless
environment, even if none of the adversaries try to block the
data packets, then the loss of data packet cannot be occurred
between Usr , WGAc and MS j . It is appeared to be a problem
of de-synchronization. Assume that the proposed SAB-UAS
scheme has last message confirmation, which is blocked or
stolen due to time overdue. Then, WGAc cannot modify or
replace the parameter pair hUID , Adi i to make the data more
inconsistent between Usr and WGAc .
VI. PRACTICAL EXAMINATION USING NS3

This section demonstrates the practical implementation of
proposed SAB-UAS using NS3 simulation [57] to examine
the network parameters such as packet delivery ratio, endto-end communication delay hSi, throughput rate of data
transmission hbpSi, and routing overhead hpacketsi. For the
analysis of the above parameters, a widely accepted version
known as NS-3.28 has been installed on the platform of
Ubuntu-14.04 LTS [6]. Table 5 shows the important parameters used in NS3 simulation that assumes a network coverage
area as 80 × 80 m2 to examine the medical sensor and device
VOLUME 7, 2019

To investigate the network metrics, the sensor nodes are
implanted in rectangular form. It has h20i sensors in a row,
which subsequently adds more concurrent rows for every execution scenario restricting the sensor quantity to be h160i nos
i.e. row size h8i. To explore a basic network scenario, three
device controller, one wireless gateway and three patients
with five medical sensors were considered. This is to note that
the wireless gateway access WGAc is not considered in [42]
to inspect the data aggregation and reliable data transmission.
The description of a network scenario is as follows: Scenario: This scenario deploysh3, 5, 9i Usr , h1i WGAc , h3i MS
and h160i MSj . For the above scenario, three data transmission messages such as hMS1 , MS2 , TS1 i from Usr to WGAc ,
hMS3 , MS4 , TS2 i from WGAc to MS and hMS5 , TS3 i from
MS to Usr are considered with the packet size of 512 bits,
512 bits, and 192 bits to examine the network parameters.
Each Usr starts randomly to exchange the message i.e. for
every 4 s. Importantly, according to the adversarial module,
h20i malicious nodes are randomly assigned to perform various misbehavior in packet routing include send and receive
messages.
A. ANALYSIS OF PACKET DELIVERY RATIO (PDR)

It is a highly essential factor to measure the performance
of routing protocol in any communication networks. In the
use of packet size, availability of nodes, transmission range
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and coverage area, this analysis was performed. This communication metric defines the successful receiving packet
delivery ratio at the sink node. From Fig.2, it is evident that
the PDR ratio of proposed SAB-UAS slightly deteriorates
when the number of sensors grows larger. Specifically, from
the addition of row i.e. 30 to 45, there was a slight deflection
in proposed SAB-UAS and Wu et al. [56] that shows better
packet delivery ratio in comparison with other authentication
schemes [54], [55]. Also, when the addition of rows grew
consistently, the signal congestion continued to exist. As a
result, the energy model defined in the wireless environment
started draining more than expected, when there was a report
of far distance message transmission. To improve the delivery
ratio, a threshold limit can be set at the receiver side to control
the energy dissipation or to abort the packet transmission
when there is a far distance communication.

FIGURE 3. End-to-end delay (sec).

The examination results show that the proposed SAB-UAS
consumes less delay in comparison with other existing
schemes [54]–[56] such as 0.0278 sec, 0.0238 sec, 0.0203 sec
and 0.0174 sec respectively. From the analysis, it is observed
that the end-to-end delay increases when the number of communication nodes is proportionally increased. As a result, it is
strongly stated that a number of transmission messages are
subjected to experience more congestion as addressed in the
given execution scenario.
C. ANALYSIS OF THROUGHPUT TRANSMISSION
RATE hTTE i
FIGURE 2. Packet delivery ratio.

From the examination, it is realized that there may be
an increasing number of connection breakdown when the
mobility varies from ∼4 ms to ∼20 ms. As a consequence,
unusual packet loss and failures are resulted to degrade the
quality of link connectivity.
B. ANALYSIS OF END-TO-END (ETE) DELAY

It is defined as the average time taken by the data transmission
packets to reach the receiver from the source node. Thus,
it can be mathematically expressed as:

XNP T rec − T send
i
i
(25)
hETEi =
i=1
NP
where NP defines the total number of data transmission
packets and hTirec , Tisend i denotes the sending and receiving
time of packet transmission with respect to the given scenario. Fig.3 illustrates the packet end-to-end delay of proposed SAB-UAS with other existing authentication schemes.
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The throughput rate can be defined as the number of bits
transmitted per unit of execution time. The throughput rate
hbpsi of proposed SAB-UAS is illustrated in Fig. 4. It can be
expressed as:
hTTEi =

(NR × |Pkt |)
TD

(26)

where TD is the total data transmission time hSecsi, Pkt is
the data transmission packet and NR is the total number of
receiving packets successfully. From Fig. 4, it is witnessed
that the execution time was considered to evaluate the number
of transmission packets i.e. for proposed SAB-UAS and other
existing authentication protocols [54]–[56]. The execution
result shows that the proposed SAB-UAS achieves better
throughput rate in comparison with other existing authentication protocols [54]–[56] such as 1.64 kbps, 1.602 kbps,
1.604 kbps, and 1.624 kbps respectively. It is evident that
the proposed SAB-UAS has a negligible deviation at 45 to
60 and 120 to 140 because of the increasing number of sensor
nodes.
VOLUME 7, 2019
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packets. In OLSR, the packet routing is tactfully managed to
enhance the network performance and bandwidth usage at the
mobility speed ≈2 to 50 m/s.
VII. CONCLUSION

FIGURE 4. Throughput rate (bps).

D. ANALYSIS OF ROUTING OVERHEAD hRTOi

The routing overhead can be defined as the total number of
routing packets divided by the total number of successfully
delivered packets during the mobility interval ≈2 to 50 m/s.
The in-depth analysis shows that the average number of
routing packets is involved to deliver a data packet successfully. Moreover, this parameter is essential to find the
excess bandwidth usage during routing overhead to handle
network traffic. The simulation result reveals that the OLSR
protocol tries to minimize the communication overhead as
it maintains a proactive routing table to handle the periodic
0 Hello0 transmission and 0 Topology Control 0 messages. From
Fig.5, it is observed that the proposed SAB-UAS achieves less
routing overhead i.e. packet in comparison with other existing
protocol [54]–[56] such as 11.3, 6.7, 5.9, and 4.5 routing

In this paper, a secure-anonymous biometric-based user
authentication scheme (SAB-UAS) has been proposed for a
smart electronic-healthcare application using IoM. The proposed SAB-UAS scheme shows the formal security model,
resource and performance efficiency analysis to prove the
security, storage and performance efficiencies. The former
proof demonstrates that the proposed scheme can protect the
sensitive information of a user from adversary to achieve the
property of perfect forward secrecy. The latter analysis shows
that the proposed SAB-UAS scheme can substantially reduce
the storage, computation and communication cost to improve
the performance efficiency of any real-time based healthcare
application systems. In addition, the rigorous informal and
formal security analysis using BAN logic and random-oracle
model proves that the SAB-UAS scheme provides better
security evidence for the protection of various potential
attacks for application based on IoMs. It is also shown that
the proposed scheme achieves improved resource efficiencies such as storage, computation, and communication to
build smart e-healthcare systems. Importantly, the network
parameters such as packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay,
and throughput rate have been evaluated using a network simulator NS3. It is shown that the proposed SAB-UAS scheme
experiences more congestion when the number of message
transmission increases proportionally i.e. adding h20i sensors
in a row. However, the proposed SAB-UAS could achieve
better packet delivery ratio, end-to-end delay, throughput rate
and routing overhead for the given scenario in comparison
with other authentication protocols [61]–[63] even if the message transmission grew proportionally between Usr , WGAc
and MS .
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